Most inflation-targeting central banks express their inflation objective in terms of a range for a single official inflation measure but generally have not clarified the meaning of the ranges and their implications for policy responses. In formulating policy, all central banks monitor multiple inflation indicators. This paper suggests an alternative approach to communicating an inflation goal: announcing point-values, rather than ranges, for a few key reference measures of inflation that are used in making policy. After reviewing and extending relevant theoretical and empirical studies, the paper argues that the alternative approach could more accurately reflect the concerns of policymakers and provide a better accountability structure for monetary policy performance.
some wiggle room in accountability discipline by announcing inflation ranges rather than point-goals and, in some cases, by articulating "escape clauses," or reasons to ignore a miss of their inflation range. This paper considers whether the above typical structure of an inflation-goal regime will prove to be best practice. It assesses whether selection of a single official inflation measure and use of a range, with occasional escape clauses, is the best accountability framework for disciplining a central bank and for fostering transparency and credibility objectives. While a unique official inflation measure may ease communication challenges at the time of implementation of an inflation goal, the long-run transparency and credibility benefits of such a framework are less obvious. The analysis is relevant not only for inflationtargeters, but also for central banks that choose to announce a long-run inflation goal without the other trappings of an inflation-targeting framework, as advocated for the United States by Bernanke (2004) , among others.
After summarizing key aspects of existing inflation-goal regimes, the paper investigates the role of inflation ranges in monetary policy frameworks. It then reviews theoretical research on an accountability standard for central banks and on optimal inflation indexes. It develops a version of the Mankiw/Reis (2003) model in order to depict how measurement uncertainties could affect the specification of an optimal price measure.
Empirical evaluations are conducted on whether the choice of an inflation index really matters and, using factor analysis, whether a unique "underlying inflation process" can be said to exist. The paper then assesses the implications for central bank accountability of a range for a single indicator versus point-values for multiple reference measures. A summary concludes.
II. Characteristics of Inflation-Goal Regimes
Over the last decade and a half, the practice of announcing specific targets for monetary policy has become more widespread among central banks. For instance, in a survey of 91 central banks around the world, Sterne (1999) reported that 87 had an explicit announced policy target of some kind in 1998 versus only 50 in 1990. The survey also found that more than half of the central banks had explicit inflation objectives, although in most cases these goals were combined with target values for other economic indicators as well, such as money growth or the exchange rate.
Currently, 21 central banks are generally classified as inflation targeters (see Table 1 Inflation reports generally include discussions of a variety of price indexes, often as a way of explaining why the deviation of headline inflation from the target is being tolerated and the extent to which other indicators may be giving a more policy-relevant inflation signal.
For example, the Bank of Canada officially targets headline CPI inflation, but at times has placed more emphasis on unofficial "operational" targets for measures of core inflation. It has devoted considerable effort to refining such core measures (Knight et al, 2002) . 2 The Bank of England's official target, until December 2001, was the retail price 2 The Bank of Canada cut interest rates in early 2001 to address slowing economic growth despite the fact that headline CPI inflation was around the top of the target range. It argued that headline inflation was only temporarily high while pointing out that core inflation was near the midpoint of the range (Knight et al, 2002) . The core inflation measure excluded energy, food, and indirect taxes until May 2001 when it was redefined to exclude fruit, vegetables, gasoline, fuel oil, natural gas, intercity transportation, tobacco, mortgage-interest, and indirect taxes. In some dynamic specifications Narrow, fixed
Expected Volatility in Inflation:
4. Indicate limits on predictability and control of inflation.
Yes Wide, varying
5. Indicate normal cyclical variation in inflation. Yes Narrow, fixed
6. Indicate an optimal trade-off between inflation stability and output/employment stability. (Sherwin, 2000) . The Riksbank has an official inflation target based on the headline CPI, but regularly discusses and forecasts several other inflation measures in its quarterly inflation reports because "various measures of 'core' or 'underlying' inflation ... have at times been more decisive for monetary policy than CPI forecasts [and] ... the idea that a certain price index would invariably yield an unambiguous signal about the optimal policy seems illfounded" (Heikensten and Vredin, 2002) .
III. Uses of Inflation Ranges
A variety of possible competing or overlapping interpretations of inflation ranges are indicated in Table 2 and grouped for discussion purposes into four categories: a diffuse goal, expected inflation volatility, a policy response structure, and/or an accountability device.
A range may indicate a diffuse goal owing to uncertainty about the optimal pointvalue, compromises among policy makers, or a flat social welfare function. The uncertainties could be related to the measurement of inflation or to the optimal cushion above true price stability. For instance, the optimal cushion would vary over time owing to evolution in the inherent stability of the economy or in the pace of structural productivity growth, 4 and a range would obviate the necessity of frequent associated adjustments in the point-goal. The compromise rationale could arise if members of a policy committee could not agree on a point-goal but could agree on a range encompassing their point-goal preferences (Santomero, 2004) . Along these lines, Tetlow (2000) models an implicit pointtarget that drifts in a random walk owing to evolving compromises among policymakers. At the boundaries of the range, policymakers agree on the need to take action to bring inflation back in line. Orphanides and Wieland (2000) model a range as reflecting a flat single-period welfare function. They point out, however, that preferences based on discounted future welfare would not be indifferent when shocks are persistent, because approaching the boundaries would then increase the chance of breaching the range in a subsequent period.
Except for such dynamic specifications with persistent shocks, these diffuse-goal rationales would tend to be associated with ranges as indifference zones and no emphasis on the midpoint. Ranges of that type have been criticized for failing to provide enough guidance for the long-run inflation expectations of the public (Bernanke et al, 1999 , Faust and Henderson, 2004 , Gavin, 2004 .
Ranges more typically have been used to signal expected volatility in inflation outcomes around a midpoint-goal. In these cases, a range could indicate a confidence interval for inflation control, movements in inflation over the business cycle that the central bank will allow, or an optimal trade-off with output or employment volatility. 4 Faster trend productivity growth would diminish the need for an inflation cushion to facilitate labor market adjustments in the presence of downward wage rigidity because declining industries could then more easily shrink with slower but still positive wage growth. It would also imply a higher equilibrium real interest rate and thereby reduce the need for an inflation cushion to cope with the risk that the central bank would hit the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates when trying to stimulate the economy.
The appropriate width of an inflation range in these cases would depend importantly on the type of volatility that it is intended to signal. The control and trade-off rationales would likely imply wider ranges than cyclical drift, and the control rationale would probably be more time-varying. Numerous authors have commented that a typical range width of 2 percentage points is too narrow to signal the limits of inflation control unless inflation stability improves dramatically (e.g., Debelle and Stevens, 1995, and Haldane and Salmane, 1995) . Cyclical movements in inflation have also been more pronounced in the past than envisioned in this rationale for a range. Estimates of range widths needed in optimal tradeoffs of stabilization goals (Taylor, 1979 , Erceg, 2002 , Faust and Henderson, 2004 ) have differed widely.
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An alternative to using an inflation range to indicate expected inflation volatility is the "fan chart," or confidence interval that expands with forecast horizon, commonly used in inflation reports. Fan charts have an advantage over ranges in this role because they allow for time-varying uncertainty and can be accompanied by situation-specific simulations and explanations.
A third category of rationales for inflation ranges is as an indicator of the monetary policy reaction function. For instance, if a range signified an indifference zone, policy might be expected to respond to inflation only when the range was breached, or perhaps shift nonlinearly to a stronger response to inflation at that time. Orphanides and Wieland (2000) 5 Reifschneider et al (1999) estimated inflation/output volatility trade-offs for a variety of Taylor-type policy rules using the FRB/US model and found that, on the policy frontier, pushing the standard deviation of four-quarter PCE inflation below 1½ percentage point resulted in the standard deviation of the output gap rising notably above 2 percentage points. Using the same model, Williams (2003) found a slightly better trade-off using a three-year average measure for inflation. Neither study developed a social welfare function to identify the optimal trade-off.
suggested that such a nonlinear reaction function could be optimal if the Phillips curve were flat near full output. Alternatively, with a hierarchical mandate, a central bank might be authorized to pursue output and employment objectives only if inflation remained in the range (see Stern and Miller, 2004, and Faust and Henderson, 2004) . If the range were breached, inflation control would take precedence.
Finally, an inflation range may also be used, explicitly or implicitly, as an accountability device. The range may signify a "safe harbor" within which the central bank would be excused for small deviations from the midpoint goal (Goodfriend, 2005 , Lacker, 2005 . Mishkin and Westelius (2005) formalize this idea in a model with a fixed penalty on the central bank for every period that a range is breached. They advocate such a disciplinary structure as a means of countering political pressures that would over-emphasize employment objectives. Before evaluating the accountability role of an inflation range, some theoretical results on optimal accountability standards are reviewed next.
IV. An Optimal Unique Accountability Standard?
Theoretical Considerations
Micro-founded macroeconomic studies have shown that maximizing the welfare of a representative agent implies a unique targeting criterion for a central bank, the specification of which depends on the model. These criteria involve relationships among the central bank's objectives rather than reaction functions for the policy instrument. In general, as pointed out by Woodford (2004) and references therein, "the target criterion should involve more than inflation" and, in particular, central banks should "commit themselves to the pursuit of explicit target criteria that involve real variables as well as inflation." The optimal target criterion typically involves weighted averages of discounted forecast values for inflation and output. Even aside from the complications associated with different specifications across economic models, the implications of these targeting criteria for the setting of the policy instrument are complex and controversial. It would be a challenge to communicate them to the public.
In the face of such challenges, some researchers have assumed that a central bank will be explicitly accountable only for a single measure of inflation; they then investigate the theoretical case for determining the optimal measure. For instance, Aoki (2001) explored the issue of optimal price indexes in a two-sector model. He found that a central bank should target prices only in the sticky-price sector when prices in the other sector are perfectly flexible. The idea is that real economic distortions are caused by the deviation of prices from long-run values, which occurs only in the sticky price sector. Mankiw and Reis (2003) showed that the optimal weight on the flex-price sector need not be zero if there are sectorspecific markup shocks, in addition to the productivity shocks assumed by Aoki, and if the sectors also differ in the variance of the shocks, expenditure shares, or responsiveness to the business cycle. A sticky-price model by Huang and Liu (2005) indicates that policy should respond to producer prices as well as consumer prices in order to reduce allocative distortions in the intermediate goods sector. Erceg et al (2000) and Levin et al (2005) find that a central bank should also place some weight on stabilizing wage inflation to avoid distortions in labor/leisure choices that could propagate widely in the economy.
Appropriate subsector weights could also depend on differences in the costs of adjustment to inflation. For instance, consumers may have more costs of compiling accurate information about inflation developments than firms, so the costs of inflation may be higher in the consumer sector. Institutionalized indexing arrangements, such as the use of the CPI to index Treasury inflation-protected securities and social security retirement benefits, reduce the cost to insured agents of adjusting to that measure of inflation, suggesting a lower weight, but may also increase the visibility of the measure and the concern of those who are not protected, arguing for a higher weight.
Differences in measurement uncertainty could also affect the choice of a price index.
Indeed, some have even argued against announcing an explicit inflation goal partly because of "conceptual uncertainties and measurement problems" in the indexes (Greenspan, 2004) .
Appendix 1 explores one aspect of this issue: the effect of transitory measurement uncertainties, differing by economic sector, on the choice of an optimal price index in a
Mankiw/Reis type of model. The analysis indicates that the presence of measurement uncertainty of this nature does not disqualify a sector from an optimal price index, but a sector's weight in the optimal index depends inversely on the extent of its measurement uncertainty. In addition, as a caveat to Aoki (2001) , the optimal price index entails a positive weight on a flex-price sector if there is any measurement uncertainty in sticky-price sectors.
This analysis suggests that establishing an inflation target based on a unique official measure may be suboptimal if that indicator is subject to measurement uncertainties.
This brief review indicates that, just as there is no clear consensus welfare function, macroeconomic model, or targeting criterion for monetary policy, there is also no theoretical consensus on specification of an optimal price index. In these circumstances, the typical practice has been to set aside the search for an optimal index and instead announce a goal based on a well-known inflation measure. A commonly used indicator is thought likely to better achieve transparency, credibility, and accountability objectives than a more obscure, specially constructed measure based on debatable claims to optimality. Some observers have gone further to suggest that, in practice, the choice of particular index may not be that important (see, e.g., Meyer, 2004) . This issue is addressed next.
If You've Seen One Price Index, Have You Seen Them All?
Previous studies have documented differences among well-known price indexes in scope and coverage, subsector weights, estimation procedures, and persistent biases (see, e.g., Clark, 1999, and Lebow and Rudd, 2003 With inclusion of core PPI indexes, available in the period since 1974, additional factors were needed to account for the co-movements among these inflation indicators. Even when restricting the analysis to the four core inflation measures or to the four consumer price measures, a single common factor was insufficient. This analysis suggests that the inflationary process may be inherently multi-faceted; no improvements in measurement may ever enable us to derive a unique index that captures even the underlying forces that are driving inflation. It supports the practice among central banks of making careful evaluation of a wide variety of inflation indicators, rather than focusing exclusively on any single measure.
V. Accountability Issues

Inflation Accountability in Principle
In light of the above discussion, would a range for a single inflation measure be a better accountability structure for a central bank than point-goals for a few reference measures? Before tackling this question, consider first the role of an accountability structure when inflation, by one measure, deviates from its goal value. Given lags, that inflation miss The role of an accountability structure should be to help align a central bank's incentives to appropriate objectives, which here involves helping to distinguish among the above cases so that discipline is applied when ex ante policy errors occur and not otherwise.
A poorly constructed accountability framework could misalign incentives in various ways.
For instance, knee-jerk responses of policy instruments to past inflation misses would be inappropriate, as a change in the current setting of policy would be called for only if an inflation miss had implications for the inflation forecast. Moreover, an accountability framework should avoid biasing incentives in favor of stabilizing inflation to the neglect of other important central bank objectives (Kohn, 2004 clauses" for inflation-targeting central banks and a regular discussion of factors affecting recent and forecast price developments in inflation reports. The presumption that a range breach calls for some explanation has itself been challenged by Faust and Henderson (2004) .
They claim that, if a range reflects an optimal trade-off between inflation and output stability, a central bank should be criticized if inflation breaches the range too seldom as well as too frequently.
Aside from ambiguities regarding the use of a range to identify policy mistakes, problems arise in devising appropriate penalties for range breaches, and enforcing them. For instance, the common practice of requiring central banks to offer public explanations when inflation breaches the range may not represent much of a penalty, as central banks are often called upon to discuss inflation outcomes and prospects, even when there is no range breach.
On the other hand, if an enforcement device is severe, such as dismissal of a central bank Governor (as is possible in New Zealand following a range breach), it may almost never be used.
Accountability with Point-Values for Several Inflation Indicators
Suppose a central bank announced a goal of low, stable inflation that it would pursue, Dennis (1997) noted that the hit to credibility from appeals to special factors would be limited if those factors were identified in advance. Pre-announcing the key inflation indicators used in formulating policy would also avoid the appearance of making after-thefact excuses in such circumstances. Indeed, the use of multiple inflation reference values provides a natural framework to facilitate discussion of special factors that beset some measures but not others.
Multiple indicators and ranges can each be misused, however. On one hand, a range can be set too wide or escape clauses used too frequently. On the other hand, a central bank could announce too many official reference measures for inflation and try to avoid responsibility for any of them. In either case, and especially if the central bank appeared to be excusing an inflation miss after the fact, credibility could be impaired.
Finally, for a central bank that announces a long-run inflation goal without adopting other aspects of inflation-targeting, a multiple indicator framework may have a particular advantage over a single-indicator range. As noted above, an accountability structure risks making policy subject to backward-looking pressures. Inflation-targeting central banks can resist such tendencies by drawing attention to forecasts in regular inflation reports and even making the forecast an intermediate target for policy (Svensson, 1997) . However, a central bank with an inflation goal but without regular inflation reports and forecasts could find itself subject to greater pressures to respond to recent inflation data, especially if a unique inflation measure was used. The "discipline" of an over-simplified accountability framework might then ironically be partly responsible for policy errors.
Experience with Monetary Aggregates
Multiple reference values for inflation might call to mind previous experiences (1 ) Taking the variance of x under the assumption of zero covariance among the shocks, the first order condition for the weight in sector A is: and speed of price adjustment, with other parameters equal across sectors, the optimal weight is: should not get all the weight in an optimal inflation index.
the common movements of the variables. As shown in the table, the tests indicate that the co-movements among these inflation measures cannot be represented by a single factor. For monthly data and for quarterly data beginning in 1959, two factors appear to be sufficient.
Additional factors are needed to explain common movements since 1974 in data sets that include core PPI series. Table 4 also reports on the "communalities," or proportion of the variance of a variable explained by the common factors. While loadings on the factors (not shown) may vary depending on the particular "rotation" chosen for the model, the proportion of the variance of each price series that is explained by the factors does not change with alternative rotations. The communalities therefore may be a more useful guide to interpreting the factors.
The first column of Table 4 indicates that a two-factor monthly model does a good job of accounting for movements in total and core PCE prices and the total CPI series since 1959, but it explains only 50 to 60 percent of the variance of the core CPI and PPI measures. 
